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1. Introduction 
A common argument in banking is that cross-border (geographic) mergers have the 
potential to reduce bank (and thus regulators’) risk of insolvency (see Segal, 1974, 
Vander Vennet, 1996, and Berger, 2000).  This conventional wisdom is based on the 
traditional notion that it is better for a bank not to put all its “eggs in one basket” and thus 
geographic diversification is a naturally risk reducing activity.  However, offsetting these 
perceived benefits are at least two potential costs that may well enhance the risk of bank 
insolvency and ultimately the risk exposure of bank regulators.1 
The first risk increasing effect comes from the incentives banks have to risk shift 
when the regulatory “safety net” and its associated implicit and explicit guarantees are 
underpriced.  As discussed by John, John, and Senbet (1991) and John, Saunders, and 
Senbet (2000), banks have incentives to increase their risk exposure beyond the level that 
would be privately optimal in a world in which there were no safety net guarantees or the 
safety net – deposit insurance, capital requirements, and implicitly, bank closure – is 
fairly priced.  One way in which the safety net might be exploited is for a bank to acquire 
other (risky) banks by cross-border expansion.  If the risky investment pays off, then the 
acquiring bank has the potential to keep any upside returns.  If the acquisition of the 
foreign target fails and the domestic bank’s (acquirer’s) solvency is threatened, then the 
acquiring bank may be bailed out either by its own home or domestic regulator or 
perhaps by the host regulator (the regulator of the target bank).  As a result, cross-border 
mergers may increase the insolvency risk exposure of either one or both the domestic 
(acquirer) and host (target) bank regulators. 
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A second reason why cross-border acquisitions may increase an acquirer’s risk 
concerns “who is watching the eggs in the basket” – see Winton (1999).  Specifically, by 
extending its operations into new overseas markets, the (domestic) bank is confronted 
with potentially new and risk increasing monitoring problems related to the loan 
customer base, the operating cost structure, etc... of the target bank.  If monitoring costs 
are high, these problems may also increase the insolvency risk of the domestic acquiring 
bank and implicitly the risk of domestic (and foreign) regulators.   
The overall question as to whether cross-border mergers are net beneficial and to 
whom they are net beneficial (i.e., bank owners, bank regulators, etc.) remains an open 
question.  For example, if cross-border mergers do not raise the risk of acquiring banks 
relative to other domestic (home country) banks, or indeed, reduces their risk, then 
domestic regulators may encourage domestic banks to expand abroad.  By contrast, if 
cross-border mergers increase the relative domestic riskiness of the acquiring bank, then 
domestic regulators may wish to scrutinize such mergers more carefully and may even 
seek to restrict them in an effort to reduce safety net subsidies and to reduce risk-shifting 
behavior. 
Similarly, with respect to the target (host) country, if the (foreign) acquiring bank’s 
risk rises relative to the risk of host country banks, then foreign acquisitions may be 
viewed as undesirable in that they increase the insolvency risk of that host country’s 
banking system.   
To gain insight into these issues, we examine cross-border bank mergers from three 
perspectives.  First, we analyze the change in total risk of an acquiring bank as a result of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Cross-border bank mergers have been on the rise for over a decade.  In 1985, Thomson Financial 
Securities Data reports twenty-eight cross-border bank mergers.  By 2000, this number had climbed to 527. 
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a cross-border banking merger.  It is the acquiring bank’s total risk relative to the risk of 
home banks that is of greatest concern to bank regulators (such as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve) in the acquirer’s home country, because of 
the regulators’ undiversified exposure to domestic bank risk.  Second, we examine the 
changes in the systematic risk of acquiring banks relative to three bank indexes: the world 
bank index, the domestic bank index and the bank index of the host country (i.e. the 
country where the target is located).  Third, we study the reaction of stock prices to news 
about the acquisition and examine the relationship between this stock price reaction and 
changes in risk brought about by cross-border bank mergers.  
The main finding of our paper is that, on average, cross-border bank mergers do not 
change the risk of acquiring banks in any significant way. This finding has important 
regulatory policy implications in that the effect of an overseas acquisition is highly bank 
dependent or idiosyncratic.  In particular, there are no general or average increases or 
decreases in either systematic or total risk.  That is, on average the risk decreasing effects 
of cross-border bank mergers are offset by risk increasing effects, and the nature of the 
merging partners’ operation changes in a way so as to leave the acquirer’s risk 
unchanged.  Thus, based on the historical sample analyzed in this paper, there is no 
overall need for regulators to be concerned with a rise in risk following cross-border 
mergers and there is no need to restrict them. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 discusses the methodology used to measure 
geographic acquisition risk.  Section 2 discusses the data used.  Section 3 details the tests 
and their results, and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Methodology 
We analyze the changes in the acquiring bank’s risk after the cross-border acquisition 
is completed compared to its risk prior to the acquisition, relative to an index of all banks 
in three domiciles: the world, the home country and the host country (i.e., the country 
where the target is located).  We also analyze the value (abnormal return) effects of these 
acquisitions.   For the analysis of risk, we compare the acquirer’s risk one year after the 
acquisition with its risk one year prior to the acquisition announcement.  Specifically, we 
analyze data from 10 to 260 days after an acquisition is completed and compare the 
results with data from 10 to 260 days before an acquisition is announced.  Since we 
analyze the acquirer’s stock return, we convert the world and host country indexes to the 
currency of the acquirer’s home country.  For example, for a British acquirer of a German 
bank, we multiply the daily host country index (the German index) by the daily exchange 
rate for £/DM, and for the world index we multiply the world index, which is given in 
terms of U.S. dollars, by the daily exchange rate for £/$.  Returns are calculated from 
these converted indexes.2 
 
2.1. Risk 
We measure the change in risk in two ways and compare its magnitude after the 
acquisition to that before the acquisition was announced. 
                                                           
2 Exchange rates before 1986 come from the New York Fed.  For exchange rate data starting in 1986, we 
use Datastream. 
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1. Total relative risk. We calculate the ratio of the variance of the acquirer’s daily 
stock returns to the variance of each of three bank index return series: world, 
home country and host country. 
2. Systematic risk.  We calculate the change in the beta coefficient of the acquiring 
bank’s stock return relative to the returns on three bank indexes: the world bank 
index and the bank indexes of the home and host countries, controlling for the 
effects of the world bank index. 
 
2.2.  Abnormal returns 
We measure abnormal returns to bank equity investors using the world, home, and 
host bank indexes as benchmarks.  The event window that we consider is the 12-day 
period surrounding the announcement of the merger, from ten days before the merger 
announcement to one day after it was announced (days −10 to +1).   The event window of 
12 days captures possible leakages of information before the merger is announced.3  We 
then analyze investor reaction to changes in total risk as well as to changes in systematic 
risk. 
 
3. Data 
We examine mergers where at least one partner is a commercial bank and the partners 
are headquartered in different countries.  The acquirer owns at least 51% of the target 
after the merger, the merger must be completed by December 1999, and the acquirer must 
be traded on a major exchange.  The Thomson Financial Securities Data Merger and 
                                                           
3 For example, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find significant leakage effects for cross-border mergers in 
the days just prior to announcements of European bank mergers. 
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Acquisition Database lists 507 such mergers announced between 1985 and 1998.   We 
use only those mergers where the acquirer’s stock is publicly traded and daily stock 
return data are available in addition to the acquirer’s country’s bank and market indexes, 
and the target country’s bank and market indexes. The data source for the individual 
banks’ returns as well as the world, home, and host indexes is DataStream.  Our final 
sample consists of 214 mergers. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1, Panel A shows the national identities of acquirers and targets (source: 
Thomson Financial Securities Data).  While banks in countries such as Australia and the 
United Kingdom are active both in acquiring and being the targets of acquisitions, other 
countries such as Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands have at least 
50% more cross-border acquisitions than targets.   Countries that have targets but no 
acquirers are usually smaller or less developed.  The U.S. has the largest number of target 
banks because it has by far the largest number of banks of any sample country.  Until 
1997, U.S. banks were restricted from pursuing full nationwide branch banking.4  This 
restriction, along with bank holding company legislation restraining domestic mergers, 
kept U.S. banks small relative to banks outside the United States.  Since targets tend to be 
smaller banks, U.S. banks were attractive takeover targets.5 
 Table 1, Panel B shows the year each merger was announced from Thomson 
Financial Securities Data.  The table reflects the steady growth in cross-border mergers 
that include a bank as at least one of the partners.  We are able to find data for five 
mergers announced in 1985.  By 1998, this number rises to 29. 
                                                           
4 Until the final repeal of the McFadden Act in 1997 (phased in starting 1994), U.S. banks were not 
permitted to engage in interstate banking except under restricted circumstances.   
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 In nearly all acquisitions, the target was not a public company. Only 30 targets 
were publicly-traded, and for 12 of them we were able to find stock market information.  
For this subset, we calculated the weighted-average return on the portfolio of the acquirer 
and the target, the weights being the market capitalization of the target and acquirer ten 
days before the merger was announced.  As with the world and host indexes, we convert 
the stock prices of the target into the acquirer’s currency.   
 
4. Tests 
4.1.  Total risk 
A common measure of total risk is the variance of a firm’s (bank’s) stock return.  We 
examine first the return variance of he acquiring bank relative to the variance of three 
bank return indexes. Denote TRRj = total relative risk of acquirer j,  
  TRRj,k = )(
)(
k
j
RBVar
RVar
                (1) 
Rj is the daily return on acquirer j and RBk is the return on bank index k, where k = world, 
home or host.  We then calculate the change in the total relative risk, ∆TRRj,k, 
∆TRRj,k = TRRj,k(after) − TRRj,k(before),            (2) 
where “after” is days +10 to +260 after the acquisition is consummated, and “before” is 
days -260 to -10 before the announcement.  In addition to examining the results for the 
entire sample, we divide the sample into subgroups according to the locations of the 
acquirers and targets.   The subgroups are mergers involving:  
1) U.S. acquirers,  
2) U.K. acquirers,  
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Buch and DeLong (2002) explore the determinants of cross-border bank mergers. 
  8
3) European acquirers with European targets,  
4) European acquirers with non-European targets, and  
5) Acquirers from the rest of the world, mainly Australia, Canada, and Japan. 
INSERT TABLE 2 
Table 2, Panel A presents the results of the tests that compare the acquirer’s (relative) 
risk before and after the acquisition.  Neither the net risk increasing nor the net risk 
decreasing hypothesis is supported by the data.  In particular, ∆TRRhome and ∆TRRhost are 
not significantly different from zero, using a Z-test.  However, there is a weak indication 
of a decline in the acquirer’s risk relative to its home bank index.  That is, in most 
mergers, 56.07% of them, ∆TRRhome < 0 and all five median values of ∆TRRhome are 
negative.  
It is instructive to compare the two groups of European bank acquisitions.  The first 
group (60) has European targets, the second group (49) has non-European targets.  
Potentially, the two groups have two conflicting effects on the acquirer’s risk.  On the 
one hand, non-European targets may be more risky – partly because of exchange rate risk 
– than European targets and therefore contribute more to the acquirer’s total risk.  On the 
other hand, the non-European targets may provide greater diversification benefits because 
the business of a European acquirer may be less correlated with the business of a 
non-European target than with that of a European target.  Overall, the evidence is that 
cross-border mergers between two European banks contribute less to the acquirer’s risk 
than mergers between European and non-European banks.  Notably, however, in both 
cases, the acquirer’s risk does not rise relative to the home bank’s risk (see ∆TRRhome 
column in Table 2, Panel A).  Thus, the results show that while the acquirer’s risk does 
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not decline after cross-border bank merger, as would be expected from the simple 
diversification story, it does not rise either.   
The results in Table 2 Panel A imply that in general, cross-border mergers do not lead 
acquirers to engage in post-merger risk shifting or risk increasing behavior.  This result 
has important regulatory implications.  Bank regulators that are concerned with the 
insolvency (total) risk of their domestic banking institutions need not be overly concerned 
that cross-border acquisition strategies pose a threat to domestic bank system stability.  
Neither is there an increase in total risk with respect to the bank index of the host country, 
where the target is located.  Thus regulators in host countries may be less concerned 
about imposing barriers to foreign acquisitions. 
In Table 2, Panel B, we examine whether the risk of the two merged banks put together 
changed after the merger.  To that end, we calculate the return on a value-weighted portfolio of 
pairs of acquirer and target firms using their market values ten days before the announcement (see 
Eun et al., 1996).  If the operational characteristics of the banks have not changed, there should be 
no change in the risk of this portfolio return relative to the benchmark indexes.   The results in 
Table 2, Panel B show, however, that relative to the risk of a portfolio of the acquirer and target 
before the merger, the risk of the acquiring bank after the merger increases relative to all three 
benchmarks. Interestingly, before the merger, the correlation between the returns of the two 
banks, acquirer and target, was extremely small (0.0227 on average). This low correlation 
suggests a significant degree of potential diversification benefits impacting the total risk of a 
portfolio of the acquirer and target at the time of acquisition.  After the acquisition, the operations 
of the acquirer and target became more integrated, which in turn is likely to have increased the 
correlation between their returns and thus increased their risk, compared to total risk prior to 
acquisition. 
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4.2.  Systematic risk 
After a domestic bank acquires a foreign bank, there is a rise in the share of its 
income that is derived from foreign markets and a decline in the share of its income that 
is derived from the domestic market.  It is thus expected that after the merger, the 
acquirer’s return will show a weaker covariance with the home market banking index and 
a stronger covariance with foreign market banking indexes -- the world as a whole and in 
particular the country where the target bank is located.  Agmon and Lessard (1977) 
showed, for U.S. multinational corporations, that the beta of their return with respect to 
the home market is lower and the beta on the world index is higher when the proportion 
of sales outside the U.S. is higher.  We examine this issue here. We expect that a cross-
border merger would reduce the acquirer’s beta with respect to the home bank portfolio 
and raise its beta with respect to the world and host bank portfolios. While regulators are 
principally concerned about the total risk of a bank from engaging in cross-border 
mergers, they might want to observe whether the cross-border merger affects the extent to 
which the acquirer’s return moves with the rest of the banks under its regulatory 
supervision.  If, for example, the acquiring bank’s beta with respect to the home market 
rises, it means that the cross-border merger augments the risk of banks in the home 
country rather than reduces it. 
Specifically, we measure the acquiring bank’s systematic risk – its β coefficient – 
relative to three bank indexes: world, home and host.  To do this, we use the world bank 
index return, RBworld, and then include the home and host bank return indexes after having 
removed the effect of the world market index.  This is obtained by regressing the home 
and host bank return indexes on the world market return index and then using the 
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respective residuals, denoted RB*home and RB*host.  The estimated model for the return of 
stock j on day t, Rj,t, is  
Rj,t = αj + βworld,j RBworld,t + γworld,j RBworld,tDt + βhome,j RB*home,t + γhome,j RB*home,tDt  
+ βhost,j RB*host,t.+ γhost,j RB*host,tDt.+ uj,t .         (3) 
Dt is a dummy variable, Dt = 0 for days -260 to day -10 before the merger announcement, 
and Dt = 1 for days +10 to +260 after the consummation of the merger.  We can directly 
obtain the change in beta, ∆βk,j, defined as follows: 
∆βk,j = βk,j(after) - βk,j(before) = γk,j ,            (4) 
where k = world, home or host.  
 Our hypotheses are as follows: 
(H1): ∆βhome should decline after cross-border mergers, since part of the acquirer’s return 
is generated by banking activity abroad which is not perfectly correlated with banking 
activity in the home market. 
(H2): ∆βworld and especially ∆βhost should rise since the acquirer’s return in part reflects 
the return on banks (and their activities) in the countries where the target bank is doing 
business. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
Surprisingly, neither hypothesis is supported by the data. The results, presented in 
Table 3, Panel A, show that ∆βk,j is not significantly different from zero for all three 
indexes.  Again, this result should assuage both domestic and host country regulator 
concerns regarding the effects of cross-border bank acquisitions on the solvency of their 
banking systems. 
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Table 3, Panel B analyzes the change in betas for the small subset of merger partners 
where we can find daily stock market return information for the target. Here, we compare 
the weighted-average betas of the merged partners before the merger is announced with 
the beta of the merged entity, where the weighting uses the acquirer’s and target’s market 
capitalization ten days before the merger is announced.  We do find a significant increase 
in the beta for the world bank index of the acquirer (as expected) but no significant 
change in either home or host country betas. 
INSERT TABLE 4 
As a further check on the results in Table 3, Panel A, we examine the changes in the 
betas in a 2x2 matrix, where ∆βhome is tabulated against ∆βhost (Table 4, Panel A) and 
∆βworld (Table 4, Panel B). In Table 4, Panel A we expect the observations to more likely 
fall into the quadrants (cells) where ∆βhome < 0 and βhost > 0.  However, we find that only 
28% of our sample adheres to this expectation.  Indeed, the outcomes in the four cells are 
largely random (with randomness not being rejected by a χ2 test).  In Table 4, Panel B, 
we expect most cases to fall into the quadrant where ∆βworld > 0 and ∆βhome < 0.  
However, only 23.8% of the cases fall into this quadrant, with the rest being distributed 
randomly among the remaining three quadrants (randomness is not rejected by a χ2 test).  
These results further confirm that cross-border bank related mergers do not 
significantly shift the acquirer’s (systematic) risk away from the home market, as might 
be expected a priori.   
So far, our analysis has been carried out using bank return indexes as the benchmark 
return indexes against which to measure relative risk changes, since we wish to compare 
the risk effects of banks that engage in cross-border merger activity versus those that do 
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not. The effect of cross-border bank mergers on bank systematic risk could alternatively 
be examined using market indexes instead of bank indexes.  However, doing this poses a 
problem since there are potentially factors that affect bank industry performance that are 
not captured by the market indexes.   Specifically, our estimation of beta changes covers 
a relatively long period of time, 250 days before and after the bank merger.  If, during 
that period, the performance of banking as an industry changes relative to the market as a 
whole – for example, due to a regulatory change that impacts all banks in a given country 
– then the betas of the merging banks would change although this change has nothing to 
do with the merger being analyzed.  Thus, using the market index as a benchmark for our 
analysis would likely confound two effects: (1) the change in the acquirer’s risk after the 
merger relative to the risk of all other banks, and (2) the change in the risk of the banking 
industry relative to the market as a whole. 
To test for this possible confounding, we estimate two alternative equations (models):  
Rj,t = αj + βworld,j RMworld,t + γworld,j RMworld,tDt + βhome,j RM*home,t  
+ γhome,j RM*home,tDt + βhost,j RM*host,t.+ γhost,j RM*host,tDt.+ uj,t .    (5) 
RBj,t = αj + βworld,j RMworld,t + γworld,j RMworld,tDt + βhome,j RM*home,t  
+ γhome,j RM*home,tDt + βhost,j RM*host,t.+ γhost,j RM*host,tDt.+ uj,t .    (6) 
Model (5) is identical to our original model (3), except that it replaces the bank index RBk 
by the market index RMk.  In model (6), the dependent variable RBj,t is the bank index in 
the home country of acquirer j.   
INSERT TABLE 5  
 The estimation results of these two models are presented in Table 5. For reasons of 
parsimony, we present only the results for the entire sample.  The results for the first 
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equation show increases in the market beta coefficients of acquirers after cross-border 
mergers against all three market indexes (only the increase in the world beta and home 
beta are significant).  The estimation results of the second equation show that banks’ 
systematic risk has risen over time relative to the market. That is, the beta coefficients of 
banks – irrespective of their involvement in cross-border mergers – increased during the 
period under study.  The reasons for this increase in bank systematic risk is an interesting 
question in itself and is not analyzed here. However, these results support our use of bank 
industry indexes rather than market indexes as benchmarks in our study of cross-border 
bank acquisitions. 
 
 4.3. Abnormal return effects 
This sub-section examines two questions:  
1. Do cross-border bank mergers benefit the acquirer’s stockholders relative to those of 
other banks not involved in cross-border mergers? 
2. Is the return on the acquirer’s stock related to changes in its risk? 
To answer these questions, we proceed as follows.  We first estimate cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the acquirer, using the following model 
  Rj,t = αj + βworld,j RBworld,t + βhome,j RB*home,t + βhost,j RB*host,t. + ∈jt   (7) 
The model is estimated over days -260 to -10 before the announcement day.  Then, we 
calculate the abnormal return for stock j on day t, ARj,t, as 
 ARj,t = Rj,t − (αj + βworld,j RBworld,t + βhome,j RB*home,t + βhost,j RB*host,t.)  (8) 
where the parameters in the parentheses in equation (8) are estimated from model (7). 
Finally, the cumulative twelve-day abnormal return, CARj, is calculated starting 10 days 
  15
before the announcement, (day 0), to account for possible leakages of information, to one 
day after the announcement:  
  CARj = ∑+
−=
1
10 ,t tj
AR                (9) 
 In general, we expect that banks only engage in acquisitions that are ex-ante value 
increasing.  Moreover, in the case of banks, investors will rationally assign value to any 
mis- (under-) priced safety net guarantees (see Kane, 2000).  These guarantees will 
potentially make bank acquisitions even more valuable to stockholders.   
INSERT TABLE 6 
Table 6.1, Panel A presents the results.  The average CAR is negative, approximately 
-1%, and is statistically significant.  This result is consistent with acquirers overpaying 
for targets even in the presence of safety net subsidies.  In nearly 63% of all cross-border 
mergers the acquirer had negative CARs (significantly different from a chance result of 
50%).  Moreover, the average CAR is negative for all five geographic groups. This means 
that cross-border acquisitions on their announcement were not perceived as beneficial to 
the acquiring bank stockholders relative to benchmark banks.  Our results of negative 
acquirer’s return resulting from cross-border acquisitions contrast with those of Doukas 
and Travlos (1988) for multinational firms.  They found that for U.S. multinational 
acquirers who were not operating in the target’s country, the acquisition announcement 
was associated with a significant positive excess returns, whereas for MNCs that were 
already operating in the target’s country, the acquisition generated a small negative and 
insignificant excess returns.  Eun et al. (1996) analyzed acquisitions of U.S. targets by 
foreign acquirers. On average, acquirers experienced negative abnormal returns, although 
the negative abnormal returns were insignificant.   
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Our results are consistent with the results of a number of studies on domestic bank 
acquisitions.6 Hawawini and Swary (1990) found, for 126 bank acquisitions between 
1968 and 1987, that the bidders’ abnormal returns were negative and significant.  
Houston and Ryngaert (1994) also found negative abnormal returns for 153 bidding U.S. 
banks between 1985 and 1991. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) found that for 54 
European bank mergers between 1988 and 1997, the acquirers’ abnormal returns were 
insignificantly different from zero.   
Examining the effects of cross-border acquisitions on the acquirer alone may 
overlook synergistic gains from cross-border mergers (see Eun et al., 1996).  These 
synergistic gains are likely to be divided between the acquirer and its target.  Following 
Eun et al. (1996), we examine where possible (given the data constraints), the total value 
creation in cross-border mergers to both acquirer and target.  To do this, we examine the 
CARs on the weighted pairs of acquirers and targets for the 12 cases where these stock 
return data are available on both banks.  The weights are the relative equity market values 
of the acquirer and target 10 days before the acquisition announcement.   
As can be seen from Table 6.1, Panel B, the average CAR on the portfolio of the 
acquirer and target is negative, 1.27%, with 75% of the sub-sample having negative 
abnormal returns. While the statistical significance is low, because of the very small 
sample size, this evidence is consistent with the results of DeLong (2001) who found 
negative abnormal returns on average for U.S. domestic bank mergers that are 
geographically diversifying.   However, the results are different from the results of Eun et 
al. (1996) on foreign acquisitions of U.S. target companies.   The difference may reflect 
the difference in industry – we examine only bank acquisitions – and target country.  
                                                           
6 For a comprehensive revise, see Piloff and Santomero (1998). 
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Overall, our results suggest that the market value effect of cross-border mergers for bank 
stockholders is negative, notwithstanding possibly synergistic gains and the underpricing 
of bank safety nets.  
We examine next whether the change in the acquirer value is related to changes in its 
risk.  There are two opposing hypotheses. 
(Ha)   An increase in risk, particularly beta risk, raises the company’s expected rate of 
return and thereby reduces its value if its cash flows remain unchanged.  Thus, CARs 
should decline when beta risk increases. 
(Hb) In a highly levered company such as bank, an increase in risk induces a transfer of 
wealth from debt holders (and regulators/taxpayers) to stockholders.  In the presence of 
wealth transfers, CARs should increase as risk increases. 
We test these hypotheses in two ways. First, we estimate the effect on CARs of 
changes in beta coefficients: 
    CARj = γ0 + γ1∆βworld,j + γ2∆βhome,j + γ3∆βhost,j        (10) 
Hypothesis (Ha) implies γk < 0 for k = 1, 2 and 3, while hypothesis (Hb) implies γk > 0.  
In estimating the model, we eliminated from each variable ∆β  extreme outliers, i.e., the 
upper and lower 1% of the distribution of the respective variable leaving 203 merger 
cases in the sample to be estimated.  
The results are presented in Table 6.2.  The evidence appears to support neither 
hypothesis (Ha) nor (Hb).  That is, acquirer’s CARs appear to be unrelated to changes in 
beta risk. 
As was discussed earlier, because of the relatively undiversified or industry specific 
exposure, domestic regulators are concerned with the total risk of the bank.  Thus, from 
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their viewpoint the proper benchmark is the home bank index.  Consequently, we also 
estimate the model: 
CARj = γ0 + γ1∆TRRj,home              (11)  
∆TRRj,home is the change in total relative risk, as defined in (1), using the home banking 
index as benchmark.  Again, we drop the extreme 1% of observations in each tail of the 
distribution of ∆TRRj,home from the sample.  The results, presented in Table 6.3, give 
weak support to hypothesis (Hb).  The change in the acquirer’s value as a result of 
cross-border acquisition is higher when the acquirer’s risk rises relative to other home 
banks. We reestimated this model as follows: 
  CARj   =  −0.015   +  0.012 DUMPOSj 
  (t stat.)  (3.69)  (1.85) 
where DUMPOSj = 1 if ∆TRRj,home > 0 and zero otherwise. The results show that in 
cross-border mergers where there was a decline in total risk relative to the acquirer’s 
home bank index, there was a significant decline in value of 1.5% (the value of the 
intercept coefficient).  However, in mergers where the total risk increased, there was 
practically no decline in value -- the positive slope coefficient almost offsets the negative 
intercept.  (In this regression, the slope coefficient was positive for all five geographical 
subgroups.)  That is, investors were better off ex ante when the acquirer’s risk increased 
after the merger.  If acquirers overpaid for targets, a decrease in risk would exacerbate 
any loss of value by inducing a transfer of wealth from stockholders to creditors, 
depositors and regulators. However, an increase in risk offsets any overpayment by 
transferring wealth from regulators and creditors to stockholders. Apparently investors 
believe that regulators, directly or indirectly, will support (with guarantees and other 
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mechanisms) the acquisition activities of large banks, even if they are ex-ante risk 
increasing. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
The growth of cross-border banking, largely driven by mergers and acquisitions, has 
raised concerns among regulators that the insolvency risk of banking systems will rise.  
Specifically, home country regulators are concerned that an acquirer’s risk will rise 
relative to its domestic competitors, while host country regulators are concerned that the 
foreign acquirer may be more risky than the target it acquires.  These concerns are 
heightened by the incentives banks have to increase risk in the presence of under-priced 
safety net guarantees and the difficulties that acquirers often have in monitoring and 
controlling the activities of their foreign acquisitions.  Indeed, such effects may well 
offset any potential diversification gains that arise from geographic diversification.   
Our main findings are interesting in that they suggest that whether an acquirer’s risk 
rises or falls, following a cross-border acquisition, is highly idiosyncratic.  On average, 
there is no evidence that cross-border merging banks add to the risk exposure of either 
domestic or host country regulators, whether looking at the total risk of the acquirer or its 
systematic risk relative to various banking industry indexes (home, host, world).  These 
results hold for cross-border mergers in general and for various sub-samples of 
interregional cross-border mergers.   
The policy implications of these results are clear, in that they do not support a 
systematic policy being adopted by regulators to limit cross-border acquisitions.  Rather, 
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they suggest (at least as far as risk is concerned) that a case by case approach should be 
adopted by both home and host country regulators. 
In addition to our main findings, we examined the announcement effects of 
cross-border mergers on acquirer’s abnormal returns.  The CARs of acquiring banks were 
significantly negative (approximately 1%).  This result is consistent with acquiring banks 
overpaying for targets even in the presence of potential safety-net subsidies.  Regressions 
linking acquirer CARs to either the systematic risk of the acquirer were generally 
insignificant, while the results show a weak positive effect of increase in the total risk 
(relative to the home bank index) on CARs.  Again suggesting that even if significant risk 
shifting opportunities exist, via cross-border mergers, stockholders do not expect 
acquiring banks to exploit them, or that such risk shifting opportunities are limited. 
In sum, the growth of cross-border banking appears to pose limited systemic risk 
dangers to the stability and solvency of the international banking system. 
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Table 1 
 
Cross-border bank mergers and acquisitions, 1985 – 1998 
 
Panel A: National identities 
 
 Country Acquirers Targets 
  
 Argentina 0 2
 Austria 0 4
 Australia 17 13
 Belgium 6 2
 Brazil 0 6
 Canada 13 3
 Denmark 3 1
 Finland 0 1
 France 28 12
 Germany 26 7
 Hong Kong 5 5
 Ireland 3 1
 Italy 4 8
 Japan 14 1
 Luxembourg 0 3
 Malaysia 2 0
 Mexico 0 3
 Netherlands 18 6
 New Zealand 0 7
 Norway 0 1
 Philippines 0 2
 Poland 0 4
 Portugal 0 3
 Singapore 4 3
 South Africa 1 3
 South Korea 2 0
 Spain 8 8
 Sweden 3 3
 Switzerland 10 5
 Thailand 0 1
 United 
Kingdom 
28 32
 United States 19 63
 Venezuela 0 1
  
 Total 214 214
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Panel B: Number of mergers announced per year 
 
   Year Number of 
mergers 
     
   1985 5 
   1986 8 
   1987 8 
   1988 12 
   1989 17 
   1990 16 
   1991 13 
   1992 15 
   1993 11 
   1994 14 
   1995 16 
   1996 24 
   1997 26 
   1998 29 
     
   Total 214 
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Table 2 
Changes in total risk 
 
Table 2, Panel A reports the change in the variance of the acquiring bank’s variance of daily stock return relative to the variance of 
three bank return indexes. TRRk,j = total relative risk of acquirer j,  TRRk,j = 
)(
)(
k
j
RBVar
RVar
. Rj is the daily return on acquirer j and RBk is 
the return on bank index k, where k  =  world, home and host  (the last two are the acquirer’s home country and the target’s country).   
The change in the total relative risk is ∆TRRk,j, ∆TRRk,j = TRRk,j(after) − TRRk,j(before), where “before” is days -260 to -10 before the 
announcement, and “after” is days +10 to +260 after the consummation of the merger. 
 
The table reports the mean and median of ∆TRRk,j and the proportion of cases where ∆TRRk,j > 0. The number in parentheses are 
t-statistics of testing the hypothesis that ∆TRRk,j = 0. The Z-statistics result from testing the hypothesis that the proportion of ∆TRRk,j > 
0 is 0.5. 
 
Table 2, Panel B reports the results tests for the 12 cases with public targets. The pre-merger returns are the weighted average of 
the partners, based on the market capitalization of the partners ten days before the merger is announced.   
 
The study consists of 214 mergers announced between 1985 and 1998 where at least one partner is a commercial bank and 
partners are headquartered in different countries.  All mergers were completed as of December 1999. 
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Table 2 (continued)  
 ∆TRRworld  ∆TRRhome  ∆TRRhost  
Panel A: Acquirer’s stock 
Acquirer’s country  
(cases) 
 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean  
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Entire sample (214) 
 
 
-0.0701 
(-0.20) 
0.1757 53.74% 
(1.09) 
-0.0193 
(-0.18) 
-0.0580 43.93%c 
(-1.78) 
-0.0983 
(-0.59) 
0.0820 54.21% 
(1.23) 
U.S. (19) 
 
 
0.5346 
(0.93) 
-0.2390 47.37% 
(-0.23) 
0.0566 
(0.09) 
-0.3836 47.37% 
(-0.23) 
0.3770 
(0.87) 
-0.0532 47.37% 
(-0.23) 
UK (28) 
 
 
0.2240 
(0.66) 
0.1455 57.14% 
(0.76) 
-0.0150 
(-0.13) 
-0.0649 32.14%c 
(-1.89) 
-0.2275 
(-1.28) 
-0.1349 42.86% 
(-0.16) 
European acquirers of  
European targets (60) 
 
-0.8856 
(-1.01) 
-0.1455 48.33% 
(-0.25) 
-0.0944 
(-0.33) 
-0.0286 46.67% 
(-0.52) 
-0.1689 
(-0.40) 
0.0950 51.67% 
(0.26) 
European acquirers of 
non-European targets 
(49) 
 
0.3688c 
(1.68) 
0.5544 61.22% 
(1.57) 
-0.0129 
(-0.12) 
-0.0074 48.98% 
(-0.14) 
0.4318b 
(2.08) 
0.2778 71.43%a 
(3.00) 
Rest of the world (58) 
 
 
0.0624 
(0.07) 
0.3421 53.45% 
(0.53) 
0.0260 
(0.20) 
-0.0910 41.38% 
(-1.31) 
-0.5664 
(-1.62) 
-0.0366 50.00% 
(0.00) 
Panel B: A portfolio of 12 acquirers and targets, value weighted (both publicly traded) 
 1.1259b 
(2.42) 
0.8054 66.67% 
(1.15) 
0.3629b 
(2.28) 
0.1302 66.67% 
(1.15) 
0.5202b 
(2.23) 
0.2598 75.00%b 
(1.73) 
 
a, b, c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Changes in systematic risk 
 
Table 3, Panel A reports the change in beta coefficient of the acquirer’s return after the cross-border merger compared to 
beforehand.  
 
Rj,t = αj + βworld,j RBworld,t + γworld,j RBworld,tDt + βhome,j RB*home,t + γhome,j RB*home,tDt + βhost,j RB*host,t.+ γhost,j RB*host,tDt.+ uj,t 
 
Rj,t is the return on acquirer j on day t, RBk,t is the bank index on day t, where k = world, home or host. RB*home, and RB*host are the 
residuals from a regression of the respective bank index return on RBworld, and D is a dummy variable that is zero for days -260 to day 
-10 before the merger announcement, and one for days +10 to +260 after the consummation of the merger.  We can directly obtain the 
change in beta from this equation: ∆βk,j =γk,j. 
  
Table 3, Panel B reports the 12 cases or subset of mergers with public targets. The pre-merger returns are the weighted average of 
the partners, based on the market capitalization of the partners ten days before the merger is announced.   
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Table 3 (continued) 
 ∆βworld ∆βhome ∆βhost 
Panel A: Acquirer’s stock 
Acquirer’s country  (cases) 
 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean  
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Entire sample (214) 
 
 
0.0032 
(0.26) 
0.0022 51.40% 
(0.41) 
0.0159 
(0.95) 
0.0015 51.40% 
(0.41) 
-0.0017 
(-0.18) 
-0.0009 49.53% 
(-0.14) 
U.S. (19) 
 
 
-0.0033 
(-0.06) 
0.0258 63.16 
(1.15) 
0.0245 
(0.28) 
-0.0313 47.37 
(-0.23) 
-0.0445 
(-1.29) 
-0.0287 36.84 
(-1.15) 
UK (28) 
 
 
-0.0523 
(-1.39) 
-0.0482 39.29 
(-1.13) 
-0.0306 
(-0.85) 
-0.0131 46.43 
(-0.38) 
-0.0149 
(-0.63) 
-0.0088 46.43 
(-0.38) 
European acquirers of  
European targets (60) 
 
0.0199 
(0.94) 
0.0097 55.00 
(0.77) 
0.0318 
(1.21) 
0.0210 60.00 
(1.55) 
0.0055 
(0.21) 
0.0006 51.67 
(0.26) 
European acquirers of 
non-European targets (49) 
 
-0.0178 
(-1.00) 
-0.0209 40.82 
(-1.29) 
0.0102 
(0.31) 
0.0129 48.98 
(-0.14) 
-0.0078 
(-0.57) 
-0.0037 46.94 
(-0.43) 
Rest of the world (58) 
 
 
0.0327 
(1.28) 
0.0234 58.62 
(1.31) 
0.0237 
(0.67) 
-0.0081 48.28 
(-0.26) 
0.0163 
(0.92) 
0.0146 55.17 
(0.79) 
Panel B: A portfolio of 12 acquirers and targets, value weighted (both publicly traded)  
 
 
0.0431 
(1.37) 
0.0568 75.00b 
(1.73) 
0.0697 
(1.58) 
0.1309 58.33 
(0.58) 
-0.0040 
(-0.10) 
0.0009 50.00 
(0.00) 
 
a, b, c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Matrices of changes in betas on home and host bank return indexes and on home and world bank return indexes as a result of a cross-
border bank merger 
 
The table reports the change in systematic risk before and after a cross-border merger.  Systematic risk is measured as the beta 
resulting from a regression of the acquiring bank’s return on the world, home, and host bank return indexes.  See Table 3 for details. 
 
Panel A: Home and host bank indexes 
  βhome  
  Decreases Increases  
    Total 
 Decreases 22.4% 26.2% 48.6% 
βhost     
 Increases 28.0 23.4 51.4 
     
Total 50.4 49.6 100 
 
H0 : 25% of observations in each cell    χ2 = 1.70, df = 1, p = 0.1922. 
 
 
Panel B: Home and world bank indexes 
  βhome  
  Decreases Increases  
    Total 
 Decreases 24.8% 23.8% 48.6% 
βworld     
 Increases 23.8 27.6 51.4 
     
Total 48.6 51.4 100 
 
H0 : 25% of observations in each cell    χ2 = 0.80, df = 1, p = 0.3700. 
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Table 5 
Changes in systematic risk using market indexes as benchmarks. 
 
The table reports the change in the beta coefficient of the acquirer’s return after cross-border merger compared to beforehand.  
 
Model 1:  Rj,t = αj + dj + βworld,j RMworld,t + γworld,j RMworld,tDt + βhome,j RM*home,t +  γhome,j RM*home,tDt + βhost,j RM*host,t.  
+ γhost,j RM*host,tDt.+ uj,t, 
 
Model 2:  RBj,t = αj + dj + βworld,j RMworld,t + γworld,j RMworld,tDt + βhome,j RM*home,t +  γhome,j RM*home,tDt + βhost,j RM*host,t.  
+ γhost,j RM*host,tDt.+ uj,t, 
 
Rj,t is the return on acquirer j on day t, and RBj,t is the bank index of the home country of acquirer j, RMk,t is the market index where k 
= world, home or host. RM*home, and RM*host are the residuals from a regression of the respective market index return on RMworld, and 
D is a dummy variable that is zero for days –260 to day –10 before the merger announcement and one for days +10 to +260 after the 
consummation of the merger.  ∆βk = γk,j.  
 
The study consists of 214 mergers announced between 1985 and 1998 where at least one partner is a commercial bank and 
partners are headquartered in different countries.  All mergers were completed as of December 1999. 
 
 
∆βworld ∆βhome ∆βhost Model 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean  
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
1 
 
 
0.0493b 
(2.67) 
0.0343 57.94%b 
(2.32) 
0.0503b 
(2.22) 
0.0214 52.34% 
(0.68) 
0.0214 
(1.43) 
0.0131 51.87% 
(0.55) 
2 0.0510a 
(3.88) 
0.0711 61.22%a 
(3.28) 
0.0257 
(1.51) 
0.0306 50.47% 
(0.14) 
0.0149b 
(2.04) 
0.0130 (54.21 
(1.23) 
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Table 6 
Market reaction to changes in systematic risk 
 
The table reports cumulative abnormal return on the acquiring stock around the time of the announcement, and the effect of 
changes in risk.  
 
 Table 6.1 measures the abnormal returns for stock j on day t, ARj,t estimated using a three factor market model: 
   ARj,t = Rj,t − (α + βworld,j RBworld,t + βhome,j RB*home,t + βhost,j RB*host,t.). 
The model is estimated over days -260 to -10 before the announcement.  The cumulative twelve-day abnormal return, CARj, is  
   CARj = ∑+
−=
1
10 ,t tj
AR . 
 
Table 6.2 measures the effects of changes in systematic risk on CAR, using the model: 
 CARj = γ0 + γ1∆βworld,j + γ2∆βhome,j + γ3∆βhost,j . 
In this regression, outliers that are at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of each RHS variable are removed. 
 
Table 6.3 measures the effect of changes in total relative risk on CAR, using the model: 
 CARj = γ0 + γ1∆TRRj,home  . 
 In this regression, outliers that are at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution of each RHS variable are removed. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Table 6.1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), descriptive statistics 
Panel A: CARs around acquisition announcement (acquirers only). 
 
Acquirer’s country  (cases) 
 
Mean 
(t-statistic) 
Median % positive 
(Z-statistic) 
Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Acquirer’s stock 
Entire sample (214) 
 
 
-0.0098a 
(-3.08) 
-0.0091 37.38%a 
(-3.69) 
-0.1498 0.2013 
U.S. (19) 
 
 
-0.0053 
(-0.52) 
0.0008 52.64 
(0.23) 
-0.0792 0.1089 
UK (28) 
 
 
-0.0238a 
(-2.93) 
-0.0285 28.57b 
(-2.27) 
-0.1013 0.0896 
European acquirers of  
European targets (60) 
 
-0.0016 
(-0.27) 
-0.0033 43.33 
(-1.03) 
-0.1015 0.2013 
European acquirers of 
non-European targets (49) 
 
-0.0129c 
(-1.79) 
-0.0133 32.65b 
(-2.43) 
-0.1498 0.1360 
Rest of the world (58) 
 
 
-0.0103c 
(-1.73) 
-0.0123 34.48b 
(-2.36) 
-0.1373 0.1450 
Panel B: A portfolio of 12 acquirers and targets, market value weighted (both publicly traded)  
 -0.0127 
(-1.68) 
-0.0094 25.00b 
(-1.73) 
-0.0837 0.0248 
 
 
 
a, b, c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Table 6.2 
Regression results of CAR on changes in betas 
 
 
Acquirer’s country  (cases) 
 
Constant 
(t-statistic) 
∆βworld 
(t-statistic) 
∆βhome 
(t-statistic) 
∆βhost 
(t-statistic) 
Adjusted-R2 
Panel A: Acquirer’s stock 
Entire sample (203) 
 
 
-0.0108a 
(-3.31) 
0.0218 
(0.79) 
0.0109 
(0.75) 
-0.0362 
(-1.17) 
0.39% 
U.S. (18) 
 
 
-0.0129 
(-1.53) 
0.0153 
(0.24) 
0.0476c 
(1.81) 
0.0076 
(0.0810) 
4.82 
U.K. (28) 
 
 
-0.0218b 
(-2.13) 
0.0573 
(0.85) 
-0.0025 
(-0.08) 
-0.0627 
(-0.71) 
-0.02 
European acquirers of 
European targets (57) 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.08) 
-0.0686 
(-0.69) 
-0.0242 
(-0.90) 
-0.0409 
(-0.89) 
-0.91 
European acquirers of 
non-European targets (48) 
 
-0.0140c 
(-1.95) 
0.0660 
(0.70) 
0.0494 
(1.47) 
-0.0853 
(-0.88) 
3.69 
Rest of the world (53) 
 
 
-0.0095 
(-1.32) 
0.0101 
(0.30) 
-0.0268 
(-0.97) 
-0.0090 
(-0.11) 
-0.04 
Panel B: A portfolio of 12 acquirers and targets, value weighted (both publicly traded)  
 -0.0068 
(-1.33) 
-0.0151 
(-0.24) 
-0.0808 
(-1.44) 
-0.0747 
(-0.93) 
24.338 
 
a, b, c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6.3 
Regression results of CAR on changes in total relative to the acquirer’s home bank index. 
 
Acquirer’s country  (cases) 
 
Constant 
 
∆TRRhome  
(t-statistic) 
Adjusted-R2 
Panel A: Acquirer’s stock 
Entire sample (209) 
 
 
-0.0095a 
(-2.98) 
0.0045c 
(1.71) 
0.50% 
U.S. (17) 
 
 
-0.0023 
(-0.21) 
0.0057c 
(2.05) 
-0.58 
U.K. (28) 
 
 
-0.0236a 
(-3.01) 
0.0155c 
(1.77) 
0.01 
European acquirers of 
European targets (57) 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.08) 
0.0016 
(0.28) 
-0.02 
European acquirers of 
non-European targets (49) 
 
-0.0127c 
(-1.79) 
0.0175c 
(1.81) 
4.68 
Rest of the world (58) 
 
 
-0.0103c 
(-1.72) 
-0.0027 
(-0.63) 
-0.01 
Panel B: A portfolio of 12 acquirers and targets, value weighted (both publicly 
traded) 
 -0.0108 
(-1.72) 
-0.0052 
(-0.47) 
-0.09 
 
a, b, c = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
